I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I? by Shepherd, Jr., Robert E. & England, Sharon S.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 4 Article 24 
1996 
"I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I?" 
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. 
Sharon S. England 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. and Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I?", 64 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1917 (1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/24 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
"I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I?" 
Cover Page Footnote 
Professor Shepherd is a Professor of Law at the T.C. Williams School of Law of the University of 
Richmond. He earned his B.A. and LL.B. at Washington and Lee University. Ms. England received her 
B.S.W. from the Pennsylvania State university and her M.S.W. from the University of Maryland and is a 
December 1995, graduate of the T.C. Williams School of Law. She has been a practicing social worker and 
social work instructor and is President of the Richmond CASA Board of Directors. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/24 
"I KNOW THE CHILD IS MY CLIENT,
BUT WHO AM I?"
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. and Sharon S. England*
INTRODUCrION
Melinda, a neglected child-Melinda entered the legal system as a
neglected child in the early 1970s.1 Melinda's mother, who had
been diagnosed as schizophrenic, suffered from numerous health
problems, and was unable to provide a stable living environment for
Melinda and her three younger brothers and sisters. The children
were ultimately removed from their mother's care pursuant to the
state's child neglect laws. While under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, Melinda lived in several different foster homes, many
times being separated from her younger siblings. At age sixteen,
she was placed in a group home. "I did not want to be in a group
home," Melinda said, "but nobody had asked me." She was finally
released from court jurisdiction into her aunt's care when she was
eighteen-and-a-half years old. Nearly two decades after Melinda in-
itially entered the legal system, she can still remember the name of
the lawyer appointed to represent the children in the child neglect
proceedings. "I will never forget him, I thought he was terrible. He
didn't spend any time with us. I saw him once outside of the court-
room, in the waiting room. He didn't know our side of the story,"
Melinda said. "He didn't know what we wanted to do. He never
asked me. I didn't know how the court procedure worked. I didn't
know if I was sending my mother to jail or sending us back home to
her. No one ever told me what was being decided."
Jose R., charged with possession of stolen property-"I've been to
court three times already and I just want to get it over with. I'm
scared and I don't know if they're going to send me to jail. I don't
know who my lawyer is. He wasn't there when the judge called my
case."
2
Jamie G., a 16-year-old convicted of assault and larceny-"My
lawyer doesn't know nothing about me, or what I do. She only met
me twice for a few minutes and never returned my phone calls. She
* Professor Shepherd is a Professor of Law at the T.C. Williams School of Law
of the University of Richmond. He earned his B.A. and LL.B. at Washington and Lee
University. Ms. England received her B.S.W. from the Pennsylvania State University
and her M.S.W. from the University of Maryland and is a December 1995, graduate of
the T.C. Williams School of Law. She has been a practicing social worker and social
work instructor and is President of the Richmond CASA Board of Directors.
1. Melinda's name has been changed to protect her identity. This discussion of
her experience comes from an interview conducted by Ms. England on June 17, 1992.
2. ABA Juvenile Justice Center, Juvenile Law Center and Youth Law Center, A
Call for Justice: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation
in Delinquency Proceedings 3 (1995) [hereinafter A Call for Justice].
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just started saying stuff to the judge about what I needed. What I
needed was a new lawyer.",3
M ELINDA, Jose, Jamie, and thousands of other dependent,
abused, neglected, delinquent, and status offending children like
them came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile and family courts in
this country at a time of tremendous growth and change in juvenile
and family law. The diverse, and sometimes incompatible, interpreta-
tions of child and family rights emanating from these courts resulted
in disparate and inequitable treatment of children and families. One
significant contributor to such treatment has been the inconsistent ap-
proach taken in the assignment of lawyers to represent children, and
the great confusion about the role of attorneys in representing chil-
dren in the courts.
There is probably no role given to a lawyer that is more challenging
than that of appearing as counsel for a child in court. Whether ap-
pearing for the child in an abuse, neglect, dependency, or custody pro-
ceeding, defending a juvenile charged with delinquency or with a
status offense, or representing a child in a mental commitment or
other matter, an attorney faces enormous challenges. Nowhere is an
attorney invited to use all of his or her skills as completely as when
dealing with the lives of children and families.
Unfortunately, it is this very same awesome responsibility which all
too often creates confusion in the minds of new and veteran attorneys
alike as to what their roles are when appearing in court on behalf of a
child. Some lawyers believe that in all instances of juvenile represen-
tation, they are to act in the "best interests of the child." In delin-
quency proceedings in particular, many lawyers feel conflicted and are
unsure of the role they are supposed to play. Is the attorney to "zeal-
ously defend" the rights of a juvenile client even if it means that a
finding of not guilty will remove the immediate possibility of any help-
ful intervention in the life of that child? What is the role of the par-
ents? How should counsel resolve the often conflicting interests of
parent and child, especially when he or she has been retained by the
parent? From whom is the attorney to receive guidance and direction
for representing an infant or very young child? When acting in a cus-
tody or abuse and neglect proceeding, what responsibility does coun-
sel have to represent the expressed wishes of the child when those
interests are in conflict with what counsel believes to be in the "best
interests of the child"? What is the role of the attorney for the child
who is the subject of a custody dispute?
As increasing poverty, violence, child maltreatment, and substance
abuse complicate the problems of children and families involved in
court proceedings, it is imperative that counsel appearing in court for
a child be equipped to handle these complexities. If the role of the
3. Id. at 36.
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attorney is to have any meaning at all, it is imperative that counsel
appearing in court for a child understand his or her role and how it
may vary and change depending upon the type of proceeding or the
developmental stage and competency of the child. The role of the
lawyer in an abuse and neglect proceeding representing a preverbal
infant may be very different from the role of an attorney representing
a child charged with a criminal offense or from counsel representing a
verbal but "impaired" child in a custody dispute. The goal of this Ar-
ticle is to attempt to define the roles that attorneys representing chil-
dren assume in the courts and to offer practical suggestions about how
to assure the effective performance of those roles.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD'S RIGHT
TO A LAWYER
Children throughout history were given little special attention by
the legal system. Their interests were invariably assumed to be
wrapped up in the interests and desires of the adults in their lives.
Until the turn of the twentieth century, they were most likely the sub-
jects of occasional court proceedings, and seldom parties or meaning-
ful participants. The coming of the juvenile court initiated a new era
in the legal system's focus on children. That court took a new, albeit
largely paternalistic, look at the interaction between youth and the
law. In a real sense, however, the juvenile court was considered to be
"antilegal." The court encouraged informality and dependency on
nonlegal resources. 4 By focusing on the "best interests" or welfare of,
these children, the "child savers" perceived no duty to formulate legal
regulations, thus effectively "disenfranchising" children of their legal
rights.5 Lawyers were seen as serving little purpose other than to ob-
struct and delay.6 "Many would say that juvenile courts in this period
were not really courts at all. There was little or no place for law, law-
yers, reporters and the usual paraphernalia of courts .... ." This in-
formality of juvenile court proceedings was almost universally upheld
in appellate court decisions.8 Therefore, the juvenile court, the very
institution responsible for protecting children and families by oversee-
ing the child welfare and juvenile criminal justice systems, and holding
them accountable, was itself operating largely without legal oversight.9
4. See Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 137
(2d ed. 1977).
5. Id. at 67.
6. Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New
Family Court, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 501, 503 (1963).
7. Walter Wadlington et al., Cases and Materials on Children in the Legal System
198 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 IM. 328, 335 (1913) (upholding statute that
limited a child's right to a jury trial because the proceeding was not the one in which a
jury trial is guaranteed); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905) (same).
9. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 198.
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In spite of the overall complexity of the laws affecting children and
their families, the United States Supreme Court has granted the right
to counsel and other significant due process protections only to those
children accused of delinquent acts. In 1966, the Court intimated in
Kent v. United States' ° that children have enforceable constitutional
rights, including the right to be represented by counsel in cases involv-
ing juvenile delinquency." The Court also acknowledged that many
of the promises of the juvenile court system had not materialized.
"[TIhe child receives the worst of both worlds ... he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children."' 2 In the following year, the Court
rejected the traditional doctrinal supremacy of parens patriae in the
historic case of In re Gault.3 The Court held that "neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' 4 " The
Court has not extended the right to counsel articulated in In re Gault
to any other proceeding in the intervening years.' Many child advo-
cates have argued, however, that the provision of legal counsel is the
only effective means for securing legal rights in this country, and that
"[i]ndependent counsel.., should be required in any case where a
child's interests are being adjudicated.' 6
Legislation expanded children's right to legal representation in
court proceedings in the era following In re Gault. The most logical
starting point for the further expansion of children's rights to counsel
was in child protection proceedings where the child was alleged to be
abused, dependent, or neglected. By 1973, however, only two states,
Colorado and New York, required the appointment of a lawyer guard-
ian ad litem ("GAL") in every case of child abuse.' 7 In 1974, in a
commendable bipartisan effort, the United States Congress responded
to growing demands for legal representation of children in such pro-
ceedings by enacting the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
("CAPTA").' 8 Hailed as a "milestone in the emergence of child rights
10. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
11. Id. at 557, 561-62.
12. Id. at 556. Because the Court ultimately decided the case on the basis of Dis-
trict of Columbia law, the due process discussions were dicta. They were, however,
predictive of later cases.
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Id. at 13.
15. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (refusing to extend the due pro-
cess protections in juvenile justice cases to mental health commitment proceedings).
16. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, in The Rights of Children, 43 Harv.
Educ. Rev. 487, 509 (1973).
17. Hearings on S. 1191 Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1973) (statement of
Brian Fraser, Staff Attorney, National Center for the Prevention and Treatment of
Child Abuse and Neglect).
18. Pub. L. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106(h)
(1988)).
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in the eyes of the law,"'19 CAPTA established the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect ("NCCAN"), which allocated federal grants
to states for the development of child abuse and neglect programs. To
qualify for federal grants prior to 1988, states were required to meet
several conditions, including the appointment of GALs in every judi-
cial proceeding involving an abused or neglected child. 0 "The ration-
ale for the appointment of a GAL in civil and criminal abuse and
neglect proceedings was that each child involved in judicial proceed-
ings needs an independent voice to advocate for his/her 'best inter-
ests.' "21 The federal mandate, however, did not require that these
GALs be attorneys, and little of NCCAN's funding was directed to
the cost of providing attorney representation for children in child pro-
tection proceedings.'
Within two years of the enactment of CAPTA, nineteen states re-
quired the appointment of GALs in child protection proceedings,
three states permitted the appointment of such a representative, and
eighteen states -either required or permitted the appointment of GALs
when certain conditions were met.23 Although all states currently pro-
vide for the appointment of GALs in child protection proceedings
either through statute, regulation, -or court practice, an independent
study by CSR, Inc., found that the congressional mandate for the
GAL representation of abused and neglected children has not been
met in an adequate fashion.24 "[I]n some court systems there is a per-
sistent disregard for Federal (and often State) legislative intent which
is not warranted by occasional case circumstances or resource limita-
tions."25 In eight states, appointment of a GAL is discretionary or
required only in some cases, resulting in a substantial number of
abused and neglected children in these states not being represented.26
19. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Final Report on the Validation and
Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through Guardian Ad Litem 1-1 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Report].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(6) (1988).
21. Final Report, supra note 19, at 1-2.
22. Howard A. Davidson, The Guardian Ad Litem: An Important Approach to the
Protection of Children, in Protecting Children Through the Legal System 836-37
(1981).
23. Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected
Child The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 16, 42-43 & n.175 (1977).
24. Final Report, supra note 19, at 1-2; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services,
National Study of Guardian Ad Litem Representation 41 (1990) [hereinafter National
Study].
25. National Study, supra note 24, at 43.
26. Id. at 9.
In Arkansas, for example, appointment [of a GAL] is required only if cus-
tody is in question. Georgia, Louisiana, and Wisconsin require appointment
only in termination of parental rights cases. Georgia law also mandates ap-
pointment when the child has no parent and Wisconsin requires representa-
tion when the child is removed from the home or in cases involving custody
or abuse restraining orders. Indiana requires GAL appointment in cases of
termination of parental rights, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, drug-addicted
19211996]
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In those states requiring the appointment of GALs in child protection
proceedings, many children still are not represented.27
The appointment of counsel for young people is even less frequent
in other proceedings involving children. For example, few states pro-
vide for lawyers for children involved in custody contests.2 Florida,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, South Dakota, and Tennessee require
the appointment of a GAL or an attorney where allegations of abuse
or neglect are involved.2 9 Alabama gives a court discretion to make
an appointment when "the court determines that representation of the
[minor's]interest otherwise would be inadequate."3 Oregon provides
for an appointment "if requested ... by one or more of the chil-
dren."'" Vermont mandates an appointment whenever a child is
called as a witness in custody or child support matters.3 Wisconsin
alone requires counsel for all children in contested custody
proceedings.3
With the exception of those who have fought hard for the enact-
ment of laws and the development of standards for the representation
newborns and whenever an abuse or neglect petition is contested. In Colo-
rado, GAL representation is mandatory in abuse cases but discretionary in
neglect cases. In Delaware, Indiana, and Texas, appointment of a GAL is
completely at the discretion of the presiding judge."
Id.
27. Id. at 11-14. The authors cautioned readers to be careful in interpreting this
data, because the estimates were based on best guesses and not precise counts, and
the "respondents may have been biased to overestimate the proportion of children
receiving GAL representation." Id. at 14. The reports were not independently veri-
fied. Id. Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming report that 100% of
abused and neglected children were represented. Id. at 11-13. Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin estimated that 90% or more of the abused and neglected chil-
dren in courts were represented. Id Georgia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington estimated over 80% of the children were represented. Id
California and Indiana estimated that 78% of the children were represented, while
Oregon estimated 69% of the children were represented. Id. at 11-12. Idaho esti-
mated that 60% were represented, and Louisiana estimated 54% of the children being
represented. Id. at 11. Florida estimated 49% of its abused and neglected children
were being represented, and Nevada estimated 32%. Id. at 11-12. Delaware esti-
mated the lowest number of abused and neglected children being represented, a mere
22%. Id. at 11.
28. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Stan-
dards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings 11
(1995) [hereinafter Representing Children].
29. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.401 (West Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.165(2)
(West 1990); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.423(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 25-4-45.4 (1992); Tenn. Ct. R. Ann., R. Juv. Proc. 37(c) (1995).
30. Ala. Code § 26-2A-52 (1992).
31. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 107.425(3) (1990).
32. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 594(a) (1989).
33. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045(1)(a)(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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of children, the nation continues to be ambivalent regarding the provi-
sion of quality legal representation to children. Such ambivalence has
contributed to role confusion for attorneys, GALs, and other child
advocates, and, consequently, turmoil for their vulnerable child cli-
ents. This uncertainty was demonstrated when Congress first enacted
CAPTA with an unfunded mandate for the appointment of GALs in
child protection proceedings. 4 It was again illustrated by numerous
federal and state court rulings granting GALs absolute immunity from
civil rights suits and negligence claims.35 Finally, the ambivalence was
dramatically demonstrated during 1995, when Congress threatened
substantially to reduce funding for CAPTA and eliminate the federal
requirement for the appointment of GALs in child protection pro-
ceedings. On January 4, 1995, the new Congressional majority intro-
duced the "Personal Responsibility Act,"36 which purported to restore
the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending,
and reduce welfare dependence. The bill, which was approved and
passed on to the Senate in two short months, also would have substan-
tially limited federal funding for AACWA, CAPTA, and other na-
tional child support programs.3 7 By converting federal funding for
foster care and abuse programs into block grants, states would be per-
mitted to make substantial cuts in the services they provide to children
and families. National programs and standards, including the require-
ment that GALs be appointed to represent children in child protec-
tion proceedings, would be eliminated. 38  The House of
Representatives took this action in spite of decades of testimony on
the increase in child abuse, neglect, and child fatality incidents, and
34. Davidson, supra note 22, at 836-37.
35. See infra part VII.A.
36. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
37. Such programs include Title IV, Child Welfare Services, and Family Preserva-
tion and Support Services Programs ("SSI").
38. Miriam A. Rollin, Legislative Update: Selected Provisions of H.R. 4, 17 The
Guardian, No. 2, at 16 (National Association of Counsel For Children, Spring 1995).
Title II of H.R. 4 eliminated federal guarantees for foster care and adoption assistance
for children who cannot live safely at home, replaced these programs, along with Fam-
ily Preservation and Support, Independent Living, Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment, and several other programs for abused and neglected children (and those at risk
of abuse and neglect) and substituted a Child Protection block grant to states, which
resulted in an estimated cut of $3.5 billion over five years. Il The bill allowed states,
after fiscal year 1997, to reduce state spending for these purposes. Id. It also allowed
the states to transfer up to 30% of Child Protection Block Grant funds to other block
grants, eliminated enforceable protections for children, including requirements that
children get services before entering foster care, be placed in licensed foster homes
and group homes, have case plans and periodic case reviews to ensure progress to-
wards permanency, and have a GAL when they have been abused or neglected. Id. It
further repealed the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act and specified that a state may not
delay or deny placement of a child on the basis of race, color, or national origin (as
did the 1994 Act), but it did not specify, as did the 1994 Act, that a state may consider
the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the child as one of the factors used to
determine the best interests of the child. Id.
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documented evidence of the states' child welfare systems' inability to
provide quality rehabilitative services. 39 The Senate Finance Commit-
tee refused to include the Child Protection Block Grant in their ver-
sion of the bill that was passed on August 8, 1995. 40 A joint
conference committee must generate a compromise between the Sen-
ate and the House regarding the future funding of these programs.
II. STUDIES OF THE EFFECTIvENESS OF LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN
Even where attorneys are provided for children in legal proceedings
where their interests are involved, several empirical studies suggest
that competent legal advocacy evades many children.41 According to
Howard A. Davidson, the question as to whether children should be
provided legal representation in legal proceedings is far from settled,
but it is clear that "children ... often lack aggressive, appropriately
trained, competent lawyer advocacy."'42 Sadly, Davidson's assessment
appears to personify Melinda and Jose's juvenile and family court to-
day. Two decades after Melinda entered the juvenile court system, a
private attorney's description of that same juvenile court suggests that
Melinda's experiences have not become a thing of the past.4 3 This
attorney complained that many of her colleagues still rarely talk to
their child clients and that others openly brag about postponing and
adjourning child protection and foster care hearings.44 Some attor-
neys even increase their fees while unnecessarily delaying dispositions
and consequently prolonging the court process for their child clients.45
The attorney continued, "A number of these people are extremely
skillful in finding any way possible to get a case adjourned because it's
another $125 in their pocket. 46
39. Id.
40. 141 Cong. Rec. S11,806 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
41. See Fimal Report, supra note 19; National Study, supra note 24; A Call For
Justice, supra note 2; Jane Knitzer & Merril Sobie, Law Guardians in New York State:
A Study of the Legal Representation of Children (1984) [hereinafter Law Guardians];
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, CSR, Inc., National Evaluation of the Im-
pact of Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse or Neglect Judicial Proceedings (1988)
[hereinafter National Evaluation]; Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Monitoring
Attorney Performance and Evaluating Program Outcomes: A Case Study of Attorneys
for Abused and Neglected Children, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 1217, 1219 (1988) [hereinafter
Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring]; Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Representa-
tion of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What Con-
stitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 341 (1987) [hereinafter
Duquette & Ramsey, Effective Representation].
42. Howard A. Davidson, Foreword to Ann M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney
xi (1993).
43. Interview by Ms. England with Gail Mazey, Private Attorney, in Detroit,
Mich. (June 1, 1992).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Given the lack of clarity concerning the lawyer's role, the ambiva-
lence regarding the existence of children's rights, and problems in the
implementation of GAL and delinquency representation programs, it
is not surprising to learn that evaluations of attorneys representing
children either as independent counsel or as GALs "have not been
favorable."4 7 Researchers have identified both systemic and individ-
ual attorney Oroblems that have contributed to the poor representa-
tion of children. Systemic issues leading to problems in the quality of
representation of children in child protection proceedings include: the
appointment of different attorneys for the same child at different
hearings, delayed attorney appointments, unavailability of training or
consultation for inexperienced attorneys,48 low rate of compensation
for attorneys, and shortage of attorneys willing to represent children.49
Problems involving attorney performance have also been character-
ized to be: "inadequate investigation, lack of contact with the child
client, lack of knowledge of the applicable law, lack of specialized-
training, and passivity with regard to both adjudication and
disposition."5
A 1983 study of attorney GALs representing children in North Car-
olina child protection proceedings concluded that the attorneys "were
not only ineffective but even tended to substantially delay a child's
return home."'" A survey of court records revealed that the attorneys
spent an average of five hours per case, including court time. Rarely
did they follow their cases after the dispositional hearing.5" The
GALs typically agreed with the local department of social services'
recommendations in 88% of the cases, leading the authors to conclude
that they were -simply a presence, rather than an influence, in the
courtroom. 53 The authors noted that "[r]epresentation seemed to be a
47. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1219 (footnote omitted).
48. Id.
49. National Study, supra note 24, at 14-15; see also National Evaluation, supra
note 41, at 18 ("The major reasons for the poor performance of private attorneys
appear to be lack of adequate compensation .... The private attorney GALs were
minimally compensated, receiving far less than needed to make a living and often not
paid for all hours they devoted to a case. Attorneys who depend on clients for their
livelihood cannot devote sufficient time to their cases.")
50. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1219.
51. Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Do Attorneys for Children in Protection
Proceedings Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Representation under Con-
ditions of High Judicial Intervention, 21 J. Far. L. 405, 407 (1982-83) [hereinafter
Kelly & Ramsey, Impact]; see also Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra -note 41, at
1219.
52. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 452.
53. Id.; see also Donald Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Using Lay Volunteers to
Represent Children in Child Protection Court Proceedings, 100 Child Abuse & Neglect
293, 297 (1986) [hereinafter Duquette & Ramsey, Lay Volunteers ] (concluding that
"a child's representative ought not agree with the social worker's recommendations
without question. While maintaining a cooperative spirit, the representative should
question the worker closely and extract the underlying basis for the caseworker's po-
1996] 1925
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
token affair, a mere procedural requirement with attorneys serving as
a rubber stamp for the recommendation of the department of social
services. This kind of system gives the illusion that abused and ne-
glected children have their own advocate when in fact they do not. 5 4
The authors cited several reasons for the apparent failure of lawyers
to effect change in the judicial system, including confusion by both
judge and attorney as to the GAL's role, "lack of training, and an
expectation that cases would take a minimal amount of the [lawyer's]
time."55 The authors hypothesized that judges may actually resent
GALs for attempting to take on what they viewed As the traditional
judicial role as the protector of the child's best interest 56 As a result
of this resentment, the researchers surmised that judges would ignore
the GAL's recommendations. 7 In addition, the GALs typically re-
ceived minimal compensation, $50 per case, which provided little in-
centive to spend adequate time on individual cases. 58 The authors
determined, however, that some GALs did have a positive impact on
their child clients; experienced lawyers who worked longer hours,
spoke to their clients, emphasized their role as negotiators, and "took
a critical stance in relation to the court and its system of providing
representation did a better job."59 Unfortunately, the authors re-
ported that "[t]he attorneys who knew how to and did represent their
clients in a manner likely to make a difference constituted a distinct
minority relative to those who did little or nothing in their role as the
child's representative."6
Many of the problems identified in these studies were also illus-
trated in 1986 litigation brought against the Office of the Guardian ad
Litem in Cook County, Illinois. In G.S. v. Goodman,61 the petitioners
sitions and recommendations. The advocate's conclusions should be reached
independently.").
54. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 453-54.
It seems fair to say that for the most part the attorneys were not expected to
spend a lot of time on these cases, and in fact most did not. They accepted
the prevailing, if implicit, definition of what constituted adequate represen-
tation-a definition which seems to have emphasized their presence as a
matter of procedural rather than substantive importance.
Id. at 453.
55. ld. at 453.
56. 1l at 451.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 452.
59. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1239. Paradoxically, in their
first report of this study, the authors also concluded that younger GALs and those
with little experience were "best able to avoid a child's removal from home." Kelly &
Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 453.
60. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1239.
61. No. 86 CH 11721 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ch. Div. Consent Degree entered
July 13, 1988). The Complaint alleged violations of the Juvenile Court Act, the Illi-
nois Constitution, and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The specific complaints included that the GAL office rou-
tinely: (1) failed to notify clients and their parents of their appointment; (2) permit-
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alleged that the GALs appointed to represent abused and neglected
children routinely failed to fulfill their litem duties to their child cli-
ents. Like Melinda, the former foster child discussed in the Introduc-
tion, the children's primary complaint was that they were either rarely
or never given the opportunity to confer with their appointed GALs.62
Four months after the suit was fled, the Guardian ad Litem Office
ceased to exist and the Public Guardian's Office took over the repre-
sentation of children in child protection proceedings.63 Nearly two
years later, the parties in the case reached a settlement that was ap-
proved by the court in June of 1988.64
In response to the growing evidence that children were not receiv-
ing adequate representation in child protection hearings, the federal
government authorized several evaluations to determine the effective-
ness of GAL representation. The first study, the National Evaluation
of the Impact of Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse or Neglect Judi-
cial Proceedings was conducted by CSR, Inc., and was published in
June 1988.65 The following year, in its reauthorization of CAPTA,
Congress directed the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to
commission another study of GAL programs.66 This study also was
ted proceedings to be conducted in their clients' absence by waiving their right to be
present without authorization from the children; (3) allowed more than six months to
pass before contacting their client (sometimes more than a year passed); (4) allowed
individual GALs to carry caseloads in excess of 400; (5) delegated decision making as
to whether a child should be brought to court to the caseworkers, opposing attorneys,
or foster parents; (6) failed to advise their clients about the status of the case, discuss
their legal options, initiate or conduct discovery, file motions of any sort, subpoena
witnesses for hearings, prepare testimony, or cross-examine witnesses; (7) assisted the
state in presenting the case against a parent, evenwhen it was contrary to the child's
objectives, and deferred to the state in making legal decisions affecting their clients;
(8) failed to object to policies and practices that injured their clients, including place-
ment in overcrowded, inhumane shelters; (9) allowed their professional judgment re-
specting the representation of their clients to be directed and regulated by a
nonattorney; (10) failed to determine the "best interests" of their clients; (11) failed to
develop a fiduciary relationship with their client; (12) failed to investigate the factual
circumstances concerning their clients' cases; (13) failed to protect their client from
harm; (14) failed to advise the court as to their clients' circumstances; (15) failed to
pursue legal rights to benefits and services for their clients; and (16) failed to fulfill
their duties as GAL for plaintiffs. Class Action Complaint at 14-17, G.S. v. Goodman
(No. 86 CH 11721).
62. For example, G.S., the lead plaintiff, was in a series of placements, including
one foster home, four group homes, and one temporary shelter, starting in March
1985. Eighteen months later she still had not met her GAL. M.S. was removed from
her mother in October 1984. She was placed in fifteen different foster homes and
other placements. Two years later she still had not been notified that a GAL had
been appointed to represent her. She had never come to court and had never met or
spoken with her attorney.
63. Stipulation at 2-3, Goodman (No. 86 CH 11721).
64. Notice of Order Approving Settlement of Lawsuit at 2, Goodman (No. 86 CH
11721).
65. National Evaluation, supra note 41.
66. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 102 Stat. 102
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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conducted by CSR, Inc., who subcontracted with the American Bar
Association Center for Children and the Law.67 The study was con-
ducted and published in two phases. Phase I of the study, the Na-
tional Study of Guardian Ad Litem Representation, furnished
descriptive information on GAL programs and was published in Octo-
ber 1990.68 Phase II of the study, reported in the Final Report on the
Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through
Guardian Ad Litem, evaluated the effectiveness of GAL legislation
and validated Phase I findings.6 9 Specifically, the Final Report's pur-
pose was to: (1) identify how legal representation to abused and ne-
glected children is provided in each state;7" (2) evaluate the
effectiveness of legal representation of children through the use of
GALs and court appointed special advocates;7 and (3) provide rec-
ommendations on how to improve the legal representation of children
in child protection proceedings.72 At least three program models of
GAL representation were identified in each of the reports: (1) the
private attorney model, (2) the staff attorney model, and (3) the Court
Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") model.73
Originally, the Final Report was intended to validate the findings of
the National Evaluation; however, the authors reported that changes
in the study design and the program due to the time lapse limited the
comparability between the two. The National Evaluation relied on an
objective analysis of judicial and social services records and outcome
measures to evaluate and compare the three different forms of GAL
representation.74 The Final Report adopted a procedural definition of
effectiveness, and relied more heavily on self-reports of the GALs,
judges and social workers on how the GALs performed in various cat-
egories of activities.75
67. See National Study, supra note 24.
68. Id
69. See Final Report, supra note 19.
70. l at 1-1.
71. Id at 5-13 to 5-15.
72. Id. at 6-1.
73. Id. In the private attorney model, the court appoints an attorney in private
practice to represent a child and provides the attorney compensation. Id. at 2-11. In
the staff attorney model, the court or city employs a staff of attorneys either directly
or through contracts with law firms, legal aid bureaus, or public defender's office. Id-
In the CASA model, lay volunteers are trained to provide representation to children.
Additional models include supervised law students and combinations of lay volun-
teers with a paid attorney. Id.; see also Duquette & Ramsey, Effective Representation,
supra note 41, at 348-50 (describing the CASA model).
74. National Evaluation, supra note 41, at 2. Three data sources were used: (1)
information gathered in interviews with juvenile court judges, state attorneys, and
GALs; (2) "information extracted from local child welfare agency records and family
court records, which provided quantitative measures of GAL performance and effec-
tiveness"; and (3) "two 'network' interviews, at each site, which provided case studies
of GAL activity." Id.
75. Final Report, supra note 19, at xiii. Data were collected from interviews with
GALs, caseworkers, and judges, and from case record extractions. Id. Five roles were
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Echoing the results of earlier empirical studies, both the Final Re-
port and the National Evaluation identified numerous deficiencies in
the representation of children in child protection proceedings. The
Final Report also determined that a substantial number of GALs had
no contact or limited contact with their child clients. Private attorneys
were the primary transgressors, with almost thirty percent of the pri-
vate attorneys reporting that they had no contact with their clients.76
The data also indicated that most private attorneys did not sufficiently
prepare their cases for the child protection proceedings.77 The judges'
responses regarding their assessments of GAL performance tended to
support the guardian's self-reports, as the judges agreed that the pri-
vate attorneys were least likely to be effective in performing their in-
vestigatory duties.78
Focusing on outcomes, the National Evaluation concluded that the
CASA model of GAL representation produced the greatest number
of outcomes in their child client's best interest:
The CASA models clearly excelled as a method of GAL representa-
tion. CASAs were highly rated by professional respondents and
outshone the other models on the quantitative best interest out-
come measure. The network interviews also revealed outstanding
performances by the volunteers. The CASA's success appeared to
be due to their intimate knowledge of the case. They conducted
extensive investigations, monitored the case closely for its duration
and developed good relationships with their child clients. CASAs
were most effective in ensuring the family was receiving services
that would lead to family reunification7 9
used to evaluate GAL effectiveness: "(1) factfinder and investigator, (2) legal repre-
sentative, (3) case monitor, (4) mediator and negotiator, and (5) resource broker." Id.
at xii; see also Donald N. Duquette, Advocating for the Child in Protection Proceed-
ings: A Handbook for Lawyers and Court Appointed Special Advocates 36-37
(1990).
76. Final Report, supra note 19, at 5-5. Over 17% of the staff attorneys and nearly
nine percent of the CASA volunteers also had no contact with their child clients. I&
77. Id. at 5-13. Private attorneys reported that they extensively prepared in 42.3%
of the cases, as compared to 71.2% of the CASA volunteers and over 60% of the staff
attorneys. Id
78. Id. at 5-15. Only 30% of the private attorneys were deemed effective in per-
forming their investigation duties, while 53% of staff attorneys were effective and
72% of CASA volunteers were effective. Id.
79. National Evaluation, supra note 41, at 18.
There appears [sic] to be two reasons for the effectiveness of CASA models:
personal motivation of the volunteers and low caseloads. CASAs are inter-
ested and committed to their work. They spend considerable time on their
cases without any monetary compensation and are willing to remain in-
volved over extended periods of time. The reasons they gave for their com-
mitinent in the network interviews-interest in children, the desire to
improve the 'system' and make an impact on a child's life-suggest strong
personal motivations.
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The National Evaluation rated the private attorney model as the
"weakest method" of providing GAL representation. 0
Private attorneys generally did not develop independent assess-
ments of the case or conduct adequate investigations, frequently did
not meet with the child before or after court appearances, did not
monitor cases, were not effective in helping the child receive serv-
ices and did not assist in placement decisions. Thus, this model re-
ceives our lowest assessment.81
In spite of the similarities in these two studies' conclusions regard-
ing private attorney performance in both performance and outcome
categories, the authors of the Final Report determined that their find-
ings did not support a conclusion that one model of GAL representa-
tion was more preferable than another.' Arguably, the disparate
outcomes in these two studies could be explained by the use of differ-
ent study designs, time lapse, and different subjects. These separate
studies, however, arrived at different conclusions even though they re-
ported similar findings within correspondingly similar categories of
effectiveness.
The essentially negative thrust of the various evaluations of the ef-
fectiveness of lawyers as GALs or counsel for children in child protec-
tion proceedings-abuse, neglect, dependency, and termination of
parental rights-has been echoed in delinquency and other juvenile or
family court matters as well. Several studies have revealed that
juveniles were represented by counsel in an even lower percentage of
cases than were children in abuse and neglect cases,8 3 in spite of the
fact that the right to counsel in delinquency cases has been a constitu-
tional mandate since the 1967 decision of In re Gault.84 Professor
Barry Feld has pointed out in a series of important articles that many
juveniles go unrepresented in delinquency matters where the risk of
loss of liberty is often quite high.8 5 Feld found that in three of the six
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id. at 15-18.
The major reasons for the poor performance of private attorneys appear to
be lack of adequate compensation and lack of training. The private attorney
GALs were minimally compensated, receiving far less than needed to make
a living and often not paid for all hours they devoted to a case. Attorneys
who depend on clients for their livelihood cannot devote sufficient time to
their cases. Private attorneys were also the only GALs that were allowed to
represent child clients with no training in their proper role. The only gui-
dance they received were court instructions or statutes which only described
the GAL role in general terms. Without training, many attorneys were not
adequately informed about their role.
Id. at 18.
82. Final Report, supra note 19, at 6-20.
83. See supra note 27 (estimating the number of cases in which children were rep-
resented in child prbtection proceedings).
84. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
85. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the Juvenile Court: A Research Agenda for the
1990s, in Juvenile Justice and Public Policy: Toward a National Agenda 59 (Ira M.
1930 [Vol. 64
DEFINING ATTORNEYS' ROLES
states where statistical data was available, less than half of the youths
tried for delinquency or status offenses were represented by counsel.86
Other studies that were completed shortly after the decision in In re
Gault showed similarly low instances of advice of the right to counsel
or the actual appointment of counsel,87 and high incidence of lawyers
doing practically nothing when they were appointed.88 Similar studies
on appointment rates were consistent with Feld's findings: Clarke and
Koch found less than half of the youths represented in two sites in
North Carolina,89 Bortner discovered that only 41.8% of the juveniles
had representation in a large, midwestern county,90 Walter and Os-
trander reported that 32% of the youngsters in a large north-central
city were represented, 91 and Aday discovered low representation rates
of 26.2% and 38.7% in two localities in a southeastern state.92 Where
counsel is provided, that attorney may have an incredibly burdensome
caseload or be inexperienced and poorly trained.
Representation by counsel may even be a setting in which the dispa-
rate handling of children of color may be manifest. A study in Michi-
gan revealed that African-American young people were visited less"
frequently in detention than white youth, and white juveniles reported
a satisfaction factor of seven on a scale of ten compared with a 5.6
rating by African-American youth.93 In one medium-sized city in the
state, white youth reported an attorney satisfaction quotient of nine
out of ten as contrasted with 3.9 for African-American youth.94
Schwartz ed., 1992); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empir-
ical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1185 (1989); Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Compar-
ison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 Crime & Delinq. 393 (1988) [herein-
after Feld, In re Gault Revisited]; Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules
of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 141 (1984).
86. Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 85, at 416. The states surveyed were
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, and
the three states with the low representation rates were Minnesota (47.7%), Nebraska
(52.7%), and North Dakota (37.5%). Id. at 401.
87. Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implemen-
tation, 3 Law & Soc'y Rev. 491, 533 (1969).
88. Emily Zenoff Ferster & Thomas F. Courtless, Pre-dispositional Data, Role of
Counsel and Decisions in a Juvenile Court, 7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 195, 207 (1972).
89. Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Con-
tro; and Do lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 263, 297 (1980). The
representations rates were 22.3% and 45.8% at the two locations in the state. Id
90. M.A. Bortner, Inside a Juvenile Court: The Tarnished Ideal of Individualized
Justice 139 (1982).
91. James D. Walter & Susan A. Ostrander, An Observational Study of a Juvenile
Court, 33 Juv. & Fain. Ct. J. 53, 59 (1982).
92. David P. Aday, Jr., Court Structure, Defense Attorney Use, and Juvenile Court
Decisions, 27 Soc. Q. 107, 112-14 (1986).
93. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, Disproportionate Rep-
resentation in Juvenile Justice in Michigan: Examining the Influence of Race and
Gender 121 (1993).
94. Id.
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The recently concluded study of the right to counsel by the Juvenile
Justice Center of the American Bar Association, the Juvenile Law
center, and the Youth Law Center for the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention of the United States Department of Jus-
tice opined "that large numbers of youth across the country appear in
juvenile court without lawyers," that "high caseloads [was] the single
most important barrier to effective representation," and that there
were "substantial deficiencies in access to counsel and the quality of
representation in juvenile court."95 That study concluded at one point
that "the assessment raised serious concerns that the interests of many
young people in juvenile court are significantly compromised, and that
many children are literally left defenseless."96
A New York Bar Association study of lawyers appointed to repre-
sent children as law guardians in delinquency and other cases also
concluded that many of them were ineffective.97 In the New York
study the researchers established several basic criteria of effectiveness:
the law guardian must "meet the client, be minimally prepared, have
some knowledge of the law and of possible dispositions, and be active
on behalf of his or her client."'98 Using these criteria, the study deter-
mined that 45% of the overall observed representation was seriously
inadequate or marginally inadequate, and it was effective in only 4%
of the observed representation. 99 Nearly 50% of the transcripts re-
vealed appealable errors made by the law guardians, or by the judges
that went unchallenged.' 00 Although law guardians were mandated
by statute to represent their child client's rights or wishes, a mail-back
survey revealed that they typically considered the child's best interest
instead.1 1 Also, the law guardians often described themselves as hav-
ing little experience or training, and that they were unclear about their
role. 0 2
III. TYPES OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH CHILDREN MAY BE
ENTITLED TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND
DESIGNATION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
Lawyers may be called upon to represent children in a great variety
of legal proceedings, including as counsel in delinquency or status of-
fense proceedings, such as children in need of services or supervision
("CHINS" or "CINS"), children in need of assistance ("CINA"),
juveniles in need of supervision or services ("JINS"), and the like, or
95. A Call for Justice, supra note 2, at 7-8.
96. Id. at 6-7.
97. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1245.
98. Law Guardians, supra note 41, at 8.
99. IaL
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1246.
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as counsel or GALs in child protection or termination of parental
rights proceedings. Lawyers may also represent children in adoptions,
or in custody or visitation cases, whether incidental to a divorce or
annulment matter, or in pendente lite temporary determinations.
Likewise, counsel may be assigned in child support or paternity mat-
ters. An attorney may also be appointed in a mental health commit-
ment proceeding pursuant to statute, or in mental retardation
certification matters. Similarly, a state statute may provide for the ap-
pointment of counsel or of a GAL in a judicial bypass proceeding in
connection with an abortion. Although other types of civil proceed-
ings are beyond the scope of this Article, a GAL may be appointed or
retained in many different forms of civil litigation, such as a personal
injury or wrongful death case, social security or workers compensation
matters, and a whole range of probate proceedings.
IV. ROLE CONFUSION
The inconsistencies in the appointment of GALs for abused and ne-
glected children are further exacerbated by the lack of clarity regard-
ing the role and responsibilities of the GAL. Neither CAPTA, its
implementing regulations, nor many state statutes have adequately
defined the roles or responsibilities of GALs.10 3 As one report has
concluded:
These statutes generally charge the GAL with protecting, promot-
ing, advocating, and/or representing the interests of the child. Most
statutes specify representation of the 'best' interests of the child,
regardless of the GAL's status as an attorney. Over one-half of the
States stop at this general role for the GAL and offer no further
guidance. 0 4
The confusion over the GAL's role also is compounded by an ongoing
debate within the legal profession regarding whether it is appropriate
for attorneys to adopt the role of GAL when representing children.'
103. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1994).
In every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judi-
cial proceeding, the State must insure the appointment of a guardian ad li-
tern or other individual whom the State recognizes as fulfilling the same
functions as a guardian ad litem, to represent and protect the rights and best
interests of the child.
ld.; see also Final Report, supra note 19, at 2-1 ("In general, the roles and responsibili-
ties of the GAL have not been clearly defined.").
104. Final Report, supra note 19, at 2-1. The Final Report also provides a statutory
survey of the treatment of roles and responsibilities of GALs. Id.
105. Emily Buss, "You're My What?": The Problem of Children's Misperceptions
of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1699 (1996); Jinanne S. J. Elder, The
Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Addressing a Troubling Question, 35
Boston B. J. 6, 8 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Re-
thinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Ford-
ham L. Rdv. 1655 (1996) [hereinafter Empowerment]; Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights
Flow Downhill, 2 Int'l J. Children's Rights 343 (1994); Martin Guggenheim, A Para-
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Regardless of the reasons for this lack of clarity over the GAL's role,
according to the CSR study "[c]oherence and consistency of GAL rep-
resentation clearly is the exception in most States."' 6 Several com-
mentators have suggested that this disparity and confusion regarding
the role can lead to attorneys failing to fulfill their professional re-
sponsibilities, providing erroneous representation, and ultimately
harming a child client.1 7 In an attempt to provide guidance for attor-
neys and CASA volunteers, various legal organizations, child advo-
cates, and courts have attempted to fill this gap by developing,
publishing, or mandating practice standards and guidelines.
V. ETHICAL CODE AND RULES CONSIDERATIONS
A. American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility ("Code") was enacted in 1969 and was the model for the
codes promulgated by most states until the adoption of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules") in 1983.108 It speaks only
superficially to the representation of children and youth, and that just
in Canon 7; which reads "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zeal-
ously Within the Bounds of the Law."'1 9 Ethical Consideration
("EC") 7-1 fleshes out the general mandate of Canon 7 by explicitly
urging the zealous representation of the client within the bounds of
legal and ethical constraints," 0 and EC 7-7 points out that decisions
affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights
of the client are exclusively those of the client."' EC 7-11 offers the
only possible guidance to the responsibilities of the lawyer represent-
ing a child by noting that such duties "may vary according to the intel-
ligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client.""' EC 7-12
digm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399
(1996) [hereinafter Paradigm]; Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Repre-
sentation-The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423 (1993); Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41; Jean Koh
Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Chil-
dren in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Edward
Sokolnicki, The Attorney as Guardian Ad Litem For A Child in Connecticut, 5 Conn.
Prob. L.J. 237 (1991); Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem As Surrogate Parents:
Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1785 (1996);
Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fam. L.Q. 349 (1993).
106. National Study, supra note 24, at 9.
107. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 411-16; Sokolnicki, supra note 30,
at 240.
108. Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules and Statutes 235 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., 1995-96 ed.).
109. I d. at 299.
110. Id. at 299-301.
111. Id. at 304.
112. Id. at 306.
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carries the caveat of 7-11 a step further by advising that a client who is
incapable of making a considered judgment casts additional and
unique responsibilities on an attorney, especially if there is no guard-
ian or other representative to assist in making decisions."'
B. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct were promul-
gated in 1983 to replace the earlier Code, and they have become the
model for about two-thirds of the states, albeit with more substantial
modifications at the state level than was the case with the Code."'
The most pertinent rule to guide lawyer representation of children is
Rule 1:14:
Rule 1.14 Client Under a Disability
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered deci-
sions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether be-
cause of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take
other protective action with respect to a client, only when the law-
yer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the
client's own interestii 5
The Comment to the rule expressly refers to the problem of represen-
tation when the client is a minor and thus "maintaining the ordinary
client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects.""' 6 Im-
portantly, the Comment points out:
[A] client lacking legal competence often has the ability to under-
stand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affect-
ing the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing
extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For
example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly
113. Id. The ethical consideration states:
If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be
compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If
the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of contribut-
ing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally
disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him
all possible aid.
AL It goes on to admonish the lawyer, if compelled to make decisions for the client,
to "act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of [the] client" while advising
that the lawyer cannot perform acts or make decisions "which the law requires his
client to perform or make," either by himself or through a personal representative.
Id.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id. at 51.
116. Id. cmt.
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those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are enti-
tled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody." 7
Other guidance offered advises that the lawyer has an "obligation to
treat the client with attention and respect," that she "often must act as
de facto guardian" if one does not exist, and should see to the "ap-
pointment [of a legal representative] where it would serve the client's
best interests.""' 8 Little further advice or direction is given about the
role of the lawyer in various proceedings or concerning the ascertain-
ment of when the minor client requires other representation or substi-
tuted decision making.
C. The Duty to Provide Competent Representation.
Both the Code and the Rules require that an attorney represent his
or her client "competently," the former in Canon 6, reinforced by Dis-
ciplinary Rule ("DR") 6-101," 9 and the latter in the more expansive
Rule 1.1, which asserts that "[c]ompetent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably nec-
essary for the representation."' 2 ° This would clearly be the most com-
mon ethical deficiency in lawyers who provide superficial or negligent
representation to children and youth in various legal proceedings, and
yet it is likely that few disciplinary actions are brought in any jurisdic-
tion alleging ethical incompetency.
VI. VARIous NATIONAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR CHILD
REPRESENTATION
A number of organizations and groups have attempted to develop
standards governing the role and functioning of lawyers representing
children, with the earliest being the Institute for Judicial Administra-
tion-American Bar Association ("IJA-ABA") Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards and other similar juvenile justice oriented guidelines developed
in, the late 1970s and early 1980s.
A. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards (1979)
Standard 3.1 of the Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Par-
ties provides:
(a) Client's interests paramount.
However engaged, the lawyer's principal duty is the representa-
tion of the client's legitimate interests. Consideration of personal
and professional advantage or convenience should not influence
counsel's advice or performance.
117. Id. at 51-52.
118. Id. at 52.
119. Id. at 297, 299.
120. Id. at 10.
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(b) Determination of client's interests.
(i) Generally.
In general, determination of the client's interests in the pro-
ceedings, and hence the plea to be entered, is ultimately the
responsibility of the client after full consultation with the
attorney.
(ii) Counsel for the juvenile.
[a] Counsel for the respondent in a delinquency or in need of
supervision proceeding should ordinarily be bound by the
client's definition of his or her interests with respect to ad-
mission or denial of the facts or conditions alleged. It is
appropriate and desirable for counsel to advise the client
concerning the probable success and consequences of
adopting any posture with respect to those proceedings.
[b] Where counsel is appointed to represent a juvenile subject
to child protective proceedings, and the juvenile is capable
of considered judgment on his or her own behalf, determi-
nation of the client's interest in the proceeding should ulti-
mately remain the client's responsibility, after full
consultation with counsel.
[c] In delinquency and in need of supervision proceedings,
where it is locally permissible to so adjudicate very young
persons, and in child protective proceedings, the respondent
may be incapable of considered judgment in his or her own
behalf.
[1] Where a guardian ad litem has been appointed, primary
responsibility for determination of the posture of the
case rests with the guardian and the juvenile.
[2] Where a guardian ad litem has not been appointed, the
attorney should ask that one be appointed.
[3] Where a guardian ad litem has not been appointed and,
for some reason, it appears that independent advice to
the juvenile will not otherwise be available, counsel
should inquire thoroughly into all circumstances that a
careful and competent person in the juvenile's position
should consider in determining the juvenile's interests
with respect to the proceeding. After consultation with
the juvenile, the parents (where their interests do not
appear to conflict with the juvenile's), and any other
family members or interested persons, the attorney may
remain neutral concerning the proceeding, limiting par-
ticipation to presentation and examination of material
evidence or, if necessary, the attorney may adopt the
position requiring the least intrusive intervention justi-
fied by the juvenile's circumstances.121
121. HJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Juvenile Justice
Standards: Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties 77-80 (1979).
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B. National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Standards for the Administration
of Juvenile Justice (1980)
The Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice issued by
the National Advisory Committee provide, in pertinent part:
Standard 3.134. Role of Counsel The principal duty of an attorney
representing the state in a family court matter is to seek justice.
The principal duty of an attorney representing a private individ-
ual in a matter within the jurisdiction of the family court should be
to represent zealously that individual's legitimate interests. Deter-
mination of the client's interest under the law should ordinarily re-
main the responsibility of the client.
If an attorney finds, after interviews and other investigation, that
a client cannot understand the nature and consequences of the pro-
ceedings and is therefore unable rationally to determine his/her own
interests in the proceedings, the attorney should bring that circum-
stance to the court's attention, ask that a guardian ad litem be ap-
pointed on the client's behalf, and advise the court of possible
conflicts of interest between the client and any person under consid-
eration for appointment as guardian ad litem.
The standards distinguish the role of the GAL from that of counsel.
Standard 3.169. Appointment and Role of Guardian Ad Litem. The
family court should appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the rights
and interests of a juvenile subject to its jurisdiction:
a. Who is incapable of adequately comprehending the nature and
consequences of and participating in the proceeding because of im-
maturity or a mental disability;
b. Whose parent, guardian, or primary caretaker does not appear
or has an adverse interest in the proceeding; or
c. Whose interests otherwise require it.
The guardian ad litem should inquire thoroughly into all the cir-
cumstances that a careful and competent individual in the juvenile's
position would in determining his/her interests in the proceeding.
The appointment should be made at the earliest feasible time af-
ter the need therefor has been shown. The court should inform
guardians ad litem, upon appointment, of their responsibilities and
powers.
Persons with interests adverse to those of the juvenile, or a public
or private institution or agency having custody of the juvenile
should not be appointed guardian ad litem.
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C. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency (1976)'"
The Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency,
in Standard 16.4 states:
A lawyer appointed to serve as guardian ad litem for a person sub-
ject to family court proceedings should inquire thoroughly into all
circumstances that a careful and competent person in the ward's po-
sition would consider in determining his or her interests in the pro-
ceeding. When the client is the respondent, the guardian ordinarily
should require proof of the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction,
and, if jurisdiction is sustained, take the position requiring the least
intrusive intervention justified by the child's circumstances. In rep-
resenting a child in Endangered Child, custody, or adoption pro-
ceedings, the guardian may limit his or her activity to presentation
and examination of material evidence or may adopt the position re-
quiring the least intrusive intervention justified by the child's
circumstances.
123
D. The National Association of Counsel for Children,
Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Abuse
and Neglect Cases (1987)
These Guidelines do not seek to define the role of the GAL in such
proceedings; rather, they describe the tasks which the attorney is to
perform during the course of such representation. 24 They define a
very proactive and comprehensive role for the lawyer
2 5
E. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing
Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad
Litem in Custody or Visitation
Proceedings (1995) 126
These Standards initially state in Standard 1.1 that counsel or GALs
should not routinely be assigned in custody or visitation proceedings,
but such appointment should be reserved for cases where "both par-
ties request the appointment or the court finds after a hearing that
appointment is necessary in light of the particular circumstances of the
case."' 27 Standards 1.2 and 1.3 further propose that "a person should
122. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention: Report of the Task Force on Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1976).
123. Id. at 557.
124. See Haralambie, supra note 42, at 283; National Association of Counsel for
Children, Deskbook and Directory 199 (1995).
125. See Haralambie, supra note 42, at 283.
126. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, supra note 28.
127. Id at 1, 9-12 (Standard 1.1 & cmt.).
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be trained in representation of children" before being eligible for an
appointment and that the court "should specify in writing the tasks
expected of the representative" whenever counsel or a GAL is as-
signed. 2 The Standards contemplate the appointment of a GAL who
is not an attorney, but admonish that a lawyer who accepts a guardian
appointment "should not combine the roles of counsel and guardian"
except in compliance with other Standards."' The major body of the
Standards focuses on the role of the attorney, which is based in large
part on whether the child client is "impaired" or "unimpaired."' 30
The representation of the "unimpaired" child is to be identical to the
representation of an unimpaired adult client,'131 and such a child has
"the right to set the goals of representation.' 1 32 With the "impaired"
child client, the lawyer is to maintain as normal a relationship as possi-
ble and should "not advocate a position with regard to the outcome of
the proceeding or issues contested during the litigation."' 33
F. Proposed American Bar Association Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect
Cases (1995).134
The proposed ABA Standards in abuse and neglect cases urge the
appointment of a "child's attorney" who will provide legal services in
much the same way as would be provided an adult client.' 35 This
"child's attorney must advocate the child's articulated position.' 1 36
This role is contrary to an appointed "guardian ad litem" who may be
obligated "to protect the child's interests without being bound by the
child's expressed preferences."' 37
G. Various State Representation Standards for Lawyers
Representing Children
Several states have promulgated standards governing the appropri-
ate function of GALs. New York was an early pioneer in this effort,
with its Law Guardian Representation Standards, promulgated by the
New York State Bar Association in 1988.138 The Guardians Ad Litem
128. Id. at 1, 13-15 (Standard 1.2 & 1.3 & cmts.).
129. Id. at 4, 37 (Standard 3.1).
130. Id. at 2, 16-23 (Standards 2.1-2.2).
131. Id. at 2, 23 (Standard 2.3).
132. Id. at 2, 24 (Standard 2.4).
133. Id. at 3, 27 (Standard 2.7).
134. 29 Fam. L.Q. 375 (1995).
135. Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse
and Neglect Cases, 29 Far. L.Q. 375, § A-1 (1995).
136. Id. at 376, § A-1 cmt.
137. Id. § A-2,
138. New York State Bar Association, Committee on Juvenile Justice and Child
Welfare, Law Guardian Representation Standards (1988). The Standards applicable
to delinquency matters may be found at pages 1-64, those relating to persons in need
of supervision ("PINS") proceedings are at pages 65-123, and those governing child
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Committees of the Justices of the Superior Court and Clerks of the
Superior Court in New Hampshire also issued guidelines, and a
number of states define the GAL's role statutorily. 139 Standards of
Practice for Guardians ad Litem were subsequently developed by a
joint GAL Standards Committee of the Colorado Bar Association
Family Law Section and Juvenile Law Forum in 1991,140 and Hawaii's
Family Court has issued Standards on Duties of a Guardian Ad Litem,
which are incorporated in the court's Order Substituting Guardian Ad
Litem. The Virginia Supreme Court has adopted Rule of Court 8.6 for
the state's juvenile courts, which provides that:
When appointed for a child, the guardian ad litem shall vigorously
represent the child fully protecting the child's interest and welfare.
The guardian ad litem shall advise the court of the wishes of the
child in any case where the wishes of the child conflict with the
opinion of the guardian ad litem as to what is in the child's interest
and welfare.' 4'
The same rule provides that in cases such as delinquency and status
offenses in which the lawyer is "counsel," "the role of counsel for a
child is the representation of the child's legitimate interests."' 42
VI. WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER FOR THE
CHILD CLIENT?
There appear to be some clear trends developing in the delineation
of roles for lawyers representing children. Most recent sets of Stan-
dards seem to advance a model of representation that is substantially
identical to that for an unimpaired adult when the child is able to give
direction to the attorney in performing tasks in the case. This model
has the distinct advantage of consistency. Given the likely continua-
tion of forces that militate against ideal representation-poor com-
pensation, large caseloads, occasional recalcitrant judges, little in the
way of investigative and other resources-a role that is familiar to the
lawyer is more apt to be performed competently. Even with the con-
scientious lawyer, considerable confusion can arise if too many differ-
protective proceedings, termination of parental rights, and foster care placement and
review may be found at pages 124-237. Id.
139. For an excellent discussion of these various Standards and statutes, as well as
some further helpful information, see Haralambie, supra note 42, at 239-88.
140. Id.
141. Va. R. Ct. 8:6 (1995). The Official Comment to the Rule indicates that the
language is designed "to track that of the ABA Standards and Virginia case law." Id-
A GAL in Virginia must be an attorney. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266.A (Michie 1988).
Virginia Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) concludes that a nonlawyer expert on
child custody and child welfare may not be appointed as a GAL. See Forty-Seventh
Ann. Rep. of the Virginia State Bar (Adv. Op. No. 62, June 30, 1985).
142. Va. R. Ct. 8:6 (1995). The Official Comment to the Rule again states that the
language is intended "to track that of the ABA Standards and Virginia case law." Va.
R. Ct. 8:6. ABA Standard 3.1 addresses the determination of the child's "legitimate
interests."
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ent models of representation are advocated. Since the 1967 In re
Gault decision, 43 the zealous advocate,'" client empowerment, or cli-
ent-centered' 45 role has widely been accepted as the standard and ex-
emplary approach.' 46 Thus, attorneys accustomed to that role in
delinquency matters can more readily fit into the same role in other
child representation scenarios. In addition, it is more common for
other participants in the legal process to have counsel clearly dedi-
cated to an advocacy role, and the judge or jury will usually hear from
other participants whose positions are being articulated by counsel to
assist in the definition of the child's "best interests."
To place the burden of advocating the child's "best interests" on the
lawyer for the child rather than merely advocating the child's wishes is
to deny the child an effective voice in the proceedings. Of course
most abused or neglected children wish to go back to the abusive
home, but who will articulate the child's desires or wishes, however
irrational it may seem to adults, if the lawyer for the minor will not do
so? In child protection proceedings, lawyers should more frequently
urge the appointment of an independent GAL, or a court-appointed
special advocate, to articulate the child's "best interests" position, and
seek to be only an advocate for what the child wants. Obviously, it is
necessary to discriminate among the child clients who are verbal and
unimpaired, those who are verbal but impaired, and those who are
pre-verbal, such as infants or older children with other disabilities.
The attorney,- however, should stick primarily to an advocacy model
and at least initiate representation premised on a presumption that
the child is competent and needs autonomy and empowerment. 147
The lawyer appointed should serve as the child's legal representative,
or attorney/champion, 148 and leave the role of the GAL or the advo-
cate for the child's "best interests" to another person who is specially
trained in child development or child psychology, or who is serving as
a CASA.14
9
Lawyers, and lay or expert GALs or CASAs, need much more
training; it is a sad commentary on the commitment of the traditional
143. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra notes 13-16 (discussing In re Gault).
144. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7.
145. See, e.g., Federle, Empowerment, supra note 105, at 1658-63.
146. 1 Randy Hertz et al., Trial Manual for Defense Attorneys in Juvenile Court
13-14 (1991); Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 105, at 1422-23.
147. Peters, supra note 105, at 1519-21; Federle, Empowerment, supra note 105, at
1661-63.
148. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representa-
tion of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301, 1301-02 (1996).
149. Indeed, there is much to be said for the particular competency of the Court-
Appointed Special Advocate to perform better in that role than an attorney. See
supra text accompanying notes 79-82; see also Rebecca Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem
in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effective-
ness, 27 Fain. L.Q. 327, 338-41 (1993) (noting that lay volunteers are more effective
than attorneys as advocates for children).
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legal system to children that CASA volunteers probably receive more
and better education in representing children and their interests than
do the lawyers. The many recent sets of standards providing for train-
ing and education prior to being eligible for appointment must be
heeded as seriously as the definition of roles.150 A great deal more
focus needs to be placed on the interviewing and counseling of chil-
dren as a central part of the lawyer's role in representing children.'
5
'
Lawyers also need to be sensitized about child-centered decision mak-
ing, 52 child development,'153 and family dynamics,' 54 so they will not
grudgingly trudge off to so-called "touchy, feely" continuing legal edu-
cation programs, grumbling all the time.
Once the duties of attorneys have been defined with some relative
degree of precision, the more difficult task that remains are the moni-
toring and accountability functions in policing representation of chil-
dren. This takes us inevitably beyond the intellectual exercise of role
definition into the more tenuous task of effective implementation.
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMPETENCY OF LAWYERS FOR
CHILDREN
A. Lawsuits and the Immunity Doctrine
Federal and state courts have generally ruled against the-civil liabil-
ity of GALs and counsel in cases involving the representation of chil-
dren in a variety of hearings, including child protection proceedings.
Like with judges, witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, probation of-
ficers, and social workers, most federal courts have accorded lawyers
for children, especially GALs, quasi-judicial status and held them to
be immune from civil liability under 42 United States Code § 1983. In
Kurzawa v. Mueller,'55 for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a GAL acting in the best interests of a child is clearly
within the judicial process and is entitled to immunity. 56 The court
stated: "A guardian ad litem must.., be able to function without the
worry of possible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied
parents.... A failure to grant immunity would hamper the duties of a
guardian ad litem in his role as advocate for the child in judicial pro-
150. See Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995) (requiring the development
of training for lawyers who serve as GALs representing children in Virginia, and man-
dating the maintenance of a list of qualified attorneys).
151. See Nancy W. Perry & Larry L. Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court
Examination of Children: Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 Creighton L. Rev.
1369 (1985).
152. Id- at 1423-25.
153. See id. at 1371-75 (providing an overview of child development within the con-
text of counseling a child).
154. Id at 1415-17.
155. 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir. 1984).
156. Id. at 1458.
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ceedings."'157 In Myers v. Morris,5 ' the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals similarly held that "nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial
functions intimately related to the judicial process have absolute im-
munity for damage claims arising from their performance of the dele-
gated functions,' 159 such as when questioning children, testifying in
court, and providing reports and recommendations to the family
court. 6 ° The court reasoned that GALs were appointed by the court
"to fulfill quasi-judicial responsibilities under court direction... [pur-
suant to] its statutory authority to seek the assistance of experts,' 6 '
therefore they should be accorded the same judicial protection. The
court in Myers also stated in dicta, however, that if a GAL's conduct
were to fall outside the scope of their official duties, the guardian
would not be protected by absolute immunity 62 Other cases have
ruled the same way.' 63
Some other federal courts have refused to grant absolute or quali-
fied immunity to GALs when the court determined that their actions
were not within the scope of their judicial duties. In Lenz v. Win-
burn,'64 the court held that the GAL was not entitled to either abso-
lute or qualified immunity when engaged in activities outside the
scope of her authority. 65 In Lenz, the GAL had accompanied a social
worker to the home of a child client, assisted in removing the child's
157. Id. In the case, John Kurzawa, who was blind, and Frances, his visually im-
paired wife, had sought assistance from the Department of Social Services with their
son Cass. Id. at 1456. Eventually, the Department successfully petitioned for the ter-
mination of the Kurzawa's parental rights. Id. at 1457. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals, however, reversed the Probate Court's decision, and Cass was returned to his
parents. Id. The Kurzawas brought a federal civil rights action, a negligence claim,
and a pendent state claim against the Department, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and
the GAL appointed to represent the best interests of Cass. Id. They brought suit
pursuant to a Michigan statute which prohibited discrimination against the handi-
capped. Id.
158. 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). This case involved
the infamous child sexual abuse investigation in Jordan, Minnesota. Id- at 1440. The
investigation began with the arrest of one individual who later pleaded guilty to multi-
ple counts of child sexual abuse. Id. at 1441. Later, over 13 individuals, including
many parents and neighbors of the children, were charged with child sexual abuse. Id-
Only one case went to trial and the defendant was acquitted. Id. All of the other
charges were thereafter dismissed. Id. Many of the defendants in those cases brought
civil rights lawsuits against the prosecutor, therapists, social workers, and GALs. Id.
159. Id. at 1466-67.
160. Id.; see also McCuen v. Polk County, 893 F.2d. 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
that GAL's actions in preparing and signing a motion for an order to stay a proceed-
ing were entitled to absolute immunity).
161. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1467.
162. Id. at 1467.
163. See, e.g., Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
GALs are absolutely immune when acting as part of the judicial process).
164. 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995). Although the GAL had raised absolute immu-
nity as a defense in the trial court, she expressly waived it in the appellate court. IaL at
1547 n.5.
165. Id. at 1547.
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personal belongings, and provided comfort to the child while she was
being removed from her father's and grandparent's home.'66 In mak-
ing its determination that the GAL was not immune, the court relied
upon the Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program Training Manual,
which excluded nonjudicially related activities from being within the
role of the GAL.'67 The court concluded that although the GAL
might "have acted as a compassionate and decent person in deciding
to provide support and a 'neutral presence,'" she acted outside the
scope of her authority as the child's GAL. 6 ' Likewise, in Oltremari v.
Kansas Social & Rehabilitative Service,'6 9 a child brought suit against
her GAL alleging that he had acted outside the scope of his duties and
had acted to her detriment, rather than her best interest, by 1) con-
spiring with another attorney to recommend a custody battle to cover
the dysfunctional handling of her case, 2) attempting to influence the
judge, 3) threatening and intimidating witnesses with lawsuits, 4) steal-
ing her mother's child support, 5) stopping her therapy, and 6) engag-
ing in gender discrimination. 70 The magistrate judge recommended
that the court overrule the GAL's motion to dismiss because he
"ha[d] not shown that he acted solely within the scope of his duties as
guardian ad litem. Nor ha[d] he shown that he conducted himself
non-maliciously and in good faith. Absent such showings, the immu-
nity afforded GALs does not attach.' 171 In Kohl v. Murphy172 the
court held that the GAL was not automatically entitled to immunity
when he engaged in allegedly nonjudicial acts such as "interviews with
the Cable News Network (CNN), appearing on television interview
shows, and writing an article for Good Housekeeping magazine.
'
"173
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a GAL was
entitled to absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim, but could be held
liable to a child client under South Carolina common law. In Fleming
v. Asbill,174 the GAL was charged with lying to a judge in open court.
The guardian had filed an ex parte affidavit requesting a "pick-up"
order to permit authorities to seize a child client from school for deliv-
ery to his grandparents, allegedly lying by saying she did not know the
whereabouts of the child's father. 75 Although the court held she was
absolutely immune from civil liability under federal law,176 it refused
166. Id. at 1543-44.
167. Id. at 1546.
168. Id at 1547.
169. 871 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Kan. 1994).
170. Id. at 1346.
171. Id. at 1347.
172. 767 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. IMI. 1991).
173. Id. at 901.
174. 42 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 1994).
175. Id. at 888.
176. Id. at 889.
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to dismiss the child's common law claims for negligence against the
guardian under state law.'77
Because the empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that not all
GALs are adequately performing their duties, some commentators
suggest that providing near blanket immunity to lawyers undermines
the protection of child clients. One respected writer has observed
that:
By following this immunity doctrine, the court assumes that guardi-
ans ad litem are doing their jobs or that appropriate mechanisms
exist to challenge them when they do not....
In some cases, the child's attorney does not do a competent job in
representing the child's interests. Immunity may become a way of
shieldins guardians ad litem from accountability, even to their own
clients.' 7
B. Monitoring Representation by Judges
Some have asserted that judicial oversight of GALs and attorneys is
sufficient to assure that they will perform their duties adequately. In
the event of poor performance, judges have the power to remove a
GAL or court-appointed attorney from the case.' 79 The empirical evi-
dence and anecdotes, however, suggest that they rarely receive ade-
quate supervision from judges. The Final Report on GALs completed
for the United States Department of Health and Human Services
identified an apparent lack of accountability and quality control of
guardians. Of the private attorneys questioned, seventy percent re-
ported that they were not supervised. s0 Apparently, the attorneys
did not perceive the judges' presence in the courtroom as supervision.
Some commentators maintain that judges seldom take action to penal-
ize "incompetent [lawyer] performance."''" Others have offered rea-
sons for the lack of forcible response by the court to apparent
attorney incompetency in child protection proceedings.
The trial judge... may empathize with the lawyer who does not
want to commit a large number of hours to a case at a below-market
rate. The judge also may be concerned with the court's caseload
177. hL at 890. Under state law, a paid GAL could be held liable to a child for
negligent acts during a custody dispute if those acts caused the child damage. The
circuit court expressed reluctance in applying such a rule to this case, referring to it as
contrary to the trend in other jurisdictions and of debatable wisdom. Id.
178. Haralambie, supra note 42, at 43-44 (citations omitted).
179. See, e.g., In re Jaeger's Will, 259 N.W. 842, 846 (Wis. 1935) (stating that the
court should relieve a GAL who cannot perform his duties); Spotts v. Spotts, 55
S.W.2d 977, 983 (Mo. 1932) (holding that a GAL is an officer of the court and subject
to its control when he fails in his duties); Parks v. Barnes, 191 S.W. 447,450 (Ky. 1917)
(noting that it is the court's duty to remove a GAL when he is ill-suited to represent
the interests of the child).
180. Final Report, supra note 19, at 4-11.
181. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1224.
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and with the costs of the program that pays the attorney.... [T]he
judge may also feel that little harm can be done since it is the
judge's decision, based on the principle of the best interests of the
child, that ultimately results in the case's disposition.182
Judges, or their designees, also may be unaware of their authority to
remove an incompetent attorney or GAL. Judges may be aware that
lawyers "are not prepared or knowledgeable, but continue to appoint
them anyway because.., there are no formalized standards for GAL
performance."'1 s3 Judges and lawyers alike also are plagued with sys-
temic problems, such as huge dockets and caseloads and inadequate
resources.'
8 4
Some courts, however, not only have established specific standards
of performance for GAL performance, but have imprinted those stan-
dards on the back of each appointment order to assure that the attor-
neys comply with them.'8 5 Other judges have reported that they do
not tolerate unprepared or ineffective attorneys or GALs, and they
will be reprimanded, removed, or not be reappointed. 8 6 In the case
of In the Interest of MFB,8 7 the Supreme Court of Wyoming, sua
sponte, admonished a GAL for his poor performance and failure to
participate in the appeal on his child client's behalf. The court said,
[W]e would remind all members of the bar serving in this capacity
that the guardian ad litem fulfills an essential duty.... [T]he guard-
ian ad litem must act with reasonable diligence in the role of an
advocate for the child ... and participate as necessary in all phases
of the process, including subsequent appeals, to insure the rights of
the client are protected.' 88
The Iowa Court of Appeals, in In the Interest of J.V. and C.W., Jr.,8 9
publicly reprimanded a GAL who was alleged to have provided inef-
fective assistance to his child clients. The parents, whose parental
rights had been terminated, claimed "the [GAL] had failed to act in-
dependently and had simply adopted the State's position."' 90 The
court concluded "[i]t simply is not sufficient for a guardian ad litem to
sit back, review the record and the arguments, and arrive at a deci-
sion.... Otherwise, the guardian ad litem is merely perfunctory, serv-
182. Id. at 1224-25.
183. Shari F. Shink, The Justice System: It Has Forgotten the Children, Colo. Law.
689, 690 (Apr. 1991).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., State of Hawaii, Family Court, First Circuit, Order Substituting
Guardian Ad Litem; Jefferson County, Kentucky, Family Court, Division Four, Order
Appointing Guardian Ad Litem.
186. Interviews by Ms. England over a period of time with Michigan and Virginia
juvenile court judges.
187. 860 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1993).
188. Id. at 1152.
189. 464 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa 1991).
190. Id. at 891.
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ing only to fulfill arcane, if not empty, requirements of due
process."' 191
Unfortunately, many juvenile court judges are unable to take effec-
tive action to remove ineffectual GALs, especially in the rural areas.
Because of the low pay, attorneys are often unwilling to accept ap-
pointments as GALs. Therefore, judges do not have the luxury of
dismissing attorneys because replacements would be difficult to find.
Some commentators suggest that "[i]f the rate of compensation is so
low that the attorneys view the time spent on the case as a charitable
contribution, they might welcome non-appointment."' 19 The Iowa
court reported in In re J.V.193 that all of the appointed counsel in the
case had candidly discussed the pervasive problem in providing coun-
sel for minor children involved in child protection proceedings. 194
Two commentators also suggest that in addition to "a market incen-
tive that acts against competence,' 95 some courts may decline to ap-
point "active lawyers because they will challenge the way the court
usually handles cases and take up additional court time and re-
sources."' 96 The 1983 North Carolina study of attorneys for children
in child protection proceedings also demonstrates this concern regard-
ing attorney independence. 197 The authors concluded that younger,
inexperienced attorneys were more able to take critical and independ-
ent positions from the court.' 98 These findings suggested to the au-
thors that a prerequisite for an effective representation system would
include institutional structures which provided autonomy and inde-
pendence for lawyers who represent children in child protection pro-
ceedings.199 The same issues are presented in delinquency cases
where lawyers say that they are sometimes reluctant to file motions
because "[j]udges don't like it when you file motions."2 ' A recent
major study of legal representation in delinquency cases revealed that
some attorneys were reluctant to challenge judges and that they
"opted for a pleasant courtroom experience by keeping in the court's
good graces."22 '
191. Id. at 893.
192. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1221.
193. 464 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
194. Id. at 891; see also Cumbie v. Cumbie, 139 S.E.2d 477, 480 (S.C. 1964) (stating
that it was apparent that the GAL made no effort whatever to protect the interest of
the minors).
195. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1221.
196. Id.
197. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 438-39; Kelly & Ramsey, Monitor-
ing, supra note 41, at 1232-40.
198. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 438-39; see also Bortner, supra note
90, at 140-43 (comparing legal representation by a public defender with that of a
private attorney).
199. Kelly & Ramsey, Impact, supra note 51, at 453.
200. A Call for Justice, supra note 2, at 32.
201. Id. at 52.
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C. Policing by Parents and by Child Clients
Although parents can ask a court to terminate a GAL's representa-
tion of their child, and they can appeal a judge's decision, as was dis-
cussed above, many of the parents involved in child protection
proceedings are unable to assert effectively their own rights due to
their lack of sophistication and impoverished living conditions.2 °2
Many of these parents have become abusive or negligent because of
their own experience with poor parenting, severe personal problems,
inability to constructively problem solve, or deal with serious situa-
tional crises. These parents typically acquiesce to social service and
juvenile court intervention rather than challenge the quality of the
legal representation their children receive or the judges' decisions. In
the event parents attempt to challenge a GAL's appointment or a ju-
dicial decision, it is unlikely that they will be successful. Courts gener-
ally will presume, in the absence of specific allegations, that the GAL
was attentive to his or her duties rather than negligent.20 3 This pre-
sumption may control even when the GAL was not present in the
courtroom at the time of trial.2 4
If children were permitted to initiate actions on their own behalf
they could serve as a possible safeguard against ineffective GAL rep-
resentation. "Many of the problems created by unresponsive
caseworkers and guardians ad litem may be avoided by giving children
a formal, independent means of initiating... proceedings. 20 5 Other
commentators acknowledge, however, that children have proven to be
ineffective in addressing inadequate representation.20 6
Unfortunately, the client in child protection proceedings suffers
from major limitations with regard to control over the attorney.
First, the child client may lack the knowledge necessary to assess the
lawyer's performance, to determine that it is inadequate and to
know how to request a new lawyer. Second, since the lawyer's em-
ployment typically is controlled by the appointing agency, the mar-
ket incentive for the attorney primarily is to perform according to
the agency's expectations, rather than to the client's.207
Even if children possessed the ability to both recognize ineffective
representation and take action, they can be thwarted by judicial hold-
ings that prohibit children from initiating court proceedings on their
202. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1220 (arguing that control
mechanisms have been ineffective in child abuse cases due to the low status of cases
involving powerless and unsophisticated clients).
203. In re Adoption of PJ.K., 359 S.W.2d 360, 367-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
204. See Meyers v. Smith, 349 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
205. Christina D. Sommer, Note, Empowering Children: Granting Foster Children
the Right to Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1200,
1228 (1994) (footnote omitted).
206. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1223; Haralambie, supra note
42, at 44.
207. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1220 (footnotes omitted).
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own behalf, or by GALs who oppose their child clients' requests for
independent counsel. In Kingsley v. Kingsley,2 °8 the court denied a
child the right independently to initiate a termination of parental
rights proceeding against his mother.209 The court in In re A.W.211
however, did permit a teenage girl's request in a sexual abuse case for
the appointment of independent counsel when the child's wishes con-
flicted with what her public guardian represented to be in her "best
interests."'2 1' Because children are not able to address effectively the
problems of inadequate representation, some commentators suggest
that perhaps they can be addressed best through professional associa-
tions and standards.212
D. The Court's Ability to Reject Recommendations
Another possible safeguard resides in the fact that the court is not
bound by, and need not accept, the recommendations of the GAL.
This possible safeguard, however, is negated by the empirical evidence
discussed above that suggests that GALs, especially private attorneys,
rarely make meaningful recommendations to the court. Often the
GAL's recommendations merely parrot the department of social ser-
vice's recommendations in abuse and neglect cases, when they should
be challenging the department's recommendations vigorously. Stud-
ies also have shown that due to large dockets, inadequate time, and
scarce resources, a significant number of child protection proceedings
are decided during quick and brief hearings.213 It is of no conse-
quence to the child that a GAL's recommendation can be ignored if it
occurs in the context of a brief inattentive hearing. This inability to
provide close attention to children involved in child protection pro-
ceedings can have tragic results.
In one urban juvenile court, a court official, the parent's attorney,
the child's independent counsel, and a social services attorney all
agreed after a brief hearing to return a three-month-old baby to his
mother's care.214 The baby, who had suffered a fracture to his right
leg and had evidence of old fractures to his arm and shoulder, was
returned to his mother even though the hospital staff, after witnessing
the mother shaking and throwing the baby into his hospital crib, sus-
208. 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
209. Id. at 790.
210. 618 N.E.2d 729 (MII. App. Ct. 1993). The public guardian had appealed a lower
court's ruling granting the girl's request to substitute "guardian ad litem" representa-
tion for independent counsel. The public guardian believed that the girl was manipu-
lated into making the request. I.L at 733.
211. Id. at 734.
212. Haralambie, supra note 42, at 44.
213. Duquette & Ramsey, Lay Volunteers, supra note 53, at 348.
214. Conversation by Ms. England during February 1992, with a supervising attor-
ney who wished to remain anonymous.
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pected child abuse.2"- A psychologist also stated unequivocally in his
report that, because the mother was incapable of caring for him, the
baby should not be returned home.216 Although the court and the
attorneys later stated that the psychologist's report had not been
made available to them, a supervising staff attorney maintained that
all of the parties, as well as the court, had copies of the psychologist's
report.217 According to this supervisor, the report was either over-
looked in the rush to expedite a busy docket or ignored.21 8 Shortly
after the baby was returned to his mother, protective services case
workers were unable to locate him.219 Several years later he is still
missing and presumed to be dead. 0
E. Professional Ethics as a Safeguard
Although attorney activities are regulated by the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, commentators have observed that neither the Code
nor the Rules adequately address the special problems of child advo-
cates."' Even the Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Counsel for
Private Parties are said not to "address with adequate specificity the
practical conflicts of interest and ethical questions that regularly arise
in the context of representing children, particularly in cases related to
child abuse and neglect." 2z Even if the regulations provided clear
guidelines for the representation of children, some experts suggest ad-
equate representation of children would continue to be elusive. They
contend that empirical studies and case examples have demonstrated
that individual members of the bar are frequently unable to regulate
themselves, and that a "flexible code of ethics" appears to "justify a
less than competent performance in representation of children, since
attorneys in these cases typically view themselves as underpaid." 3
Commentators have suggested that there is a clear need for addi-
tional regulations in the representation of poor and powerless cli-
ents. 24 Given the inability of the bar, the judiciary, and clients to
monitor effectively the performance of attorneys in child protection
proceedings, these commentators argue for the establishment of moni-
toring programs to evaluate the quality of child representation.2 s As
Kelly and Ramsey have urged, "A well-designed monitoring and eval-
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id
220. Id-
221. Haralambie, supra note 42, at 24.
222. Davidson, supra note 42, at xiii.
223. Kelly & Ramsey, Monitoring, supra note 41, at 1223.
224. Id. at 1218.
225. Id. at 1225.
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uation program can serve not only to deter inadequate work, but also
can be extremely useful to attorneys because the development of such
a system demands that standards for attorney performance and pro-
gram goals be clearly defined and readily accessible."226
CONCLUSION
Although many attorneys do provide aggressive and effective advo-
cacy on behalf of their child clients in court proceedings, the numbers
of children who are not provided quality representation are substan-
tial. Effective and aggressive representation of children in legal pro-
ceedings is "within our reach." '227 Many child advocates, judges,
attorneys, probation officers, and CASA volunteers already know
what works. The improvement of the quality of representation of chil-
dren, however, must include both a systemic and an individual ap-
proach. A systemic approach must include the identification and
enforcement of clearly defined roles and standards for the representa-
tion of children. The Fordhamn Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Children, and the products of its deliberations con-
tained in these pages, may assist in defining those roles and standards
more precisely and carefully. The Conference Recommendations,
when combined with other standards and a plethora of well-designed
training programs, may serve to facilitate judges, lawyers, and other
child advocates in assuring that children are provided proper and
dedicated representation. Rather than "reinventing the wheel," they
merely need to select one that best meets their community's needs.
Many commentators would urge that a particular role (advocate
counsel over GAL, or attorney over CASA volunteer) should be
adopted or that a particular set of standards should be implemented
uniformly throughout the country. In the absence of a federal pro-
scription, however, and given that a substantial amount of representa-
tion of children currently occurs within a vacuum, the prompt
implementation of well-chosen roles and standards should take prece-
dence over the arduous, if not impossible, task of attainment of uni-
formity. Once the roles and accompanying standards are elected,
monitoring devices, either through the courts, bar associations, or
other review mechanisms to assure the proper implementation of
these roles and standards must be implemented. Finally, those factors
that contribute to unmanageable dockets, large caseloads, and inade-
quate reimbursement of legal counsel and GALs must be identified
and remedied. Obviously, budget constraints and legislators' reluc-
tance to allocate funds to legal services for children will be a major
226. Id. Kelly & Ramsey urge that to be effective the monitoring and evaluation
programs should be inclusive and provide sanctions and control. Id. The system
should be self-starting, rather than simply triggered by referrals. Id. at 1225-31.
227. Lisbeth B. Schorr & Daniel Schorr, Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of
Disadvantage (1989).
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barrier. Without adequate resources to support the implementation
of these roles and standards, however, representation of children in
legal proceedings, often designed for their protection, is unlikely to
improve.
Individual attorneys, bar associations, CASA volunteers, and other
child advocates also should contribute to the improvement of child
representation in court proceedings. First, these individuals and
groups must make a personal and professional commitment to provide
children with quality representation. In particular, private attorneys
should not accept appointments if they are not willing or able to
devote the necessary time to perform their duties properly. Staff at-
torneys should challenge thefr agency structures that permit excessive
caseloads, making it impossible to provide individual children effec-
tive legal representation. CASA volunteers and other child advocates
should only agree to volunteer if they can make a substantial commit-
ment of time to their child clients. All of these individuals should per-
sonally assure that they attend the necessary training programs to
guarantee that they are knowledgeable and qualified to perform their
legal duties.
The American Bar Association, in its landmark report America's
Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action, 2 stated that
which may be obvious but is seldom observed:
Even when children are represented, the representation they re-
ceive is sometimes inadequate.
... Children's cases are often 'processed,' not advocated, and too
frequently children's interests are poorly represented. In the past
decades, courts have been increasingly inundated with cases con-
cerning family matters; rarely have -resources for competent repre-
sentation or services grown to meet the expanded needs.
... Meaningful protection of children's rights requires that children
be represented by highly skilled counsel at critical stages of critical
proceedings. Competent professional representation in proceedings
that involve children is vital in a system where decisions about chil-
dren's rights and liberties and those of their parents are decided.229
Thousands more pages can, and perhaps shall, be written regarding
the appropriate role for attorneys or others representing children in
legal proceedings, but unless society and the legal profession are wil-
ing to provide truly competent and highly committed lawyers and lay
advocates, the only consequence of these continuing efforts will be
more dead trees.
228. ABA, America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action
(1993).
229. Id. at 7.
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